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Chapter One 
Introduction 
1. Background and problem statement of the study 
Zambia has, since independence in 1964, endeavoured to build an effective local government 
system anchored on decentralisation in an effort to attain the values and principles of democracy, 
autonomy and transparency. These values and principles are essential in enhancing service 
delivery and development. Within the South African context, De Visser and May argue, in 
keeping with the developmental imperatives for decentralisation, that local governments should 
be entrusted with fundamental powers and functions related to basic service delivery.
1
 A local 
government entrusted with fundamental powers is said to be the best foundation for building 
democracy, social and economic development.
2
 Therefore, the desire to build a strong 
foundation for an effective local government system is what motivates the design of local 
government administrations in many countries. One of the essential aspects in the design of a 
local government system is administrative autonomy. 
Administrative autonomy is important because it plays a complementary role to the realisation of 
political and fiscal autonomy. Administrative autonomy refers to the discretion to appoint, 
remunerate, discipline and dismiss staff as well as determining internal administrative 
procedures.
3
 It further ensures that the implementation of local policies is locally directed and 
driven by promoting accountability of local administrative officials to sub-national 
governments.
4
  
In an effort to have a local government system that promotes accountability of local 
administrative officials to sub-national governments, Zambia has over the years employed three 
systems of local government administrations from 1964 to 2016 namely, the separate, unified 
and integrated systems.  
                                                          
1
 De Visser J & May A  ‘Functions and powers of South Africa’s Provinces and municipalities’ in Steytler N & Ghai 
Y (eds) Devolution in Kenya and South Africa  (2015) 159. 
2
 Myerson R ‘Empowered local government is the best foundation for building democracy’  available at 
www.huffingtonpost.com/roger.../empowered-local-government_b_4715746.html (accessed on 20 June 2017). 
3
 Chigwata TC The law and policy for provincial and local government in Zimbabwe: The potential to realise 
development, build democracy and sustain peace (unpublished PhD thesis, University of the Western Cape, 2014) 
69. 
4
 Chigwata TC (2014) 69. 
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The change in systems of local government administration was in an effort to make local 
government democratic and ensure that relevant personnel policies are developed. As a result, 
the country has been enacting various pieces of legislation on local governance since 1964 to 
date as will be discussed in Chapter three of this thesis. Notable among the legislation on local 
governance was the 2010 Local Government (Amendment) Act. The 2010 amended Act 
provided for the Local Government Service Commission (LGSC) with powers to hire, transfer, 
fire and discipline staff.
5
 Subsequently, the powers and functions of the LGSC to administer 
council staff matters were maintained in the 2016 amended Zambian Constitution.  
The 2016 Zambian Constitution provides for, inter alia, a devolved local government system 
through the establishment of autonomous local governments charged with the management and 
administration of state affairs at local level.
6
 To this end, the 2016 Constitution contains 
provisions which guarantee autonomy and respect for the constitutional jurisdiction of local 
authorities in several ways. For instance, each local authority is required to administer local 
affairs
7
 without the national government interfering or compromising a local authority’s ability 
to perform its functions.
8
  
The 2016 Constitution also provides for the establishment of democratically elected councils 
based on universal suffrage,
9
 and also guarantees autonomy in the exercise of executive and 
legislative powers.
10
 The Constitution further empowers councils to oversee programmes and 
projects in the districts and encourages the involvement of communities in local government 
matters.
11
  
Therefore, the letter and spirit of the 2016 Zambian Constitution seems to provide a firm 
foundation for local government based on the principles of devolution.
12
 The provisions on a 
devolved local government system seem to have a great potential in as far as guaranteeing local 
                                                          
5
 The Local Government Amendment Act, the Act, Act 6 of 2010 Ss 93 and 94. 
6
 Constitution of the Republic of Zambia: Constitution (Amendment) Act No.2 of 2016 Art 147(1). 
7
 Art 147 (3)(b)(c) Constitution (Amendment) Act No.2. 
8
 Art 152 (2) Constitution (Amendment) Act No.2. 
9
 Art 151 (2) Constitution (Amendment) Act No.2. 
10
 Art 152 (1) Constitution (Amendment) Act No.2. 
11
 Art 151 (2)(b)(g) Constitution (Amendment) Act No.2. 
12
 Art 147 Constitution (Amendment) Act No.2. 
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government autonomy and fostering social and economic development of local communities are 
concerned.  
However, despite the 2016 Constitution laying a firm foundation for a devolved local 
government system, the current practice of local governance, especially in matters relating to 
administrative autonomy, raises serious concerns regarding the extent to which local authorities 
in Zambia actually have autonomy. Instead of decentralising, the national government has 
centralised many of the local government functions. For instance, the national government has, 
through some legislative amendments, institutional frameworks and other mechanisms, 
centralised the recruitment, transfers and disciplining of council staff.
13
 As a result, local 
authorities now have to rely on higher levels to implement local policies, thereby making it 
difficult for local governments to adapt their internal administrative procedures to the local 
environments.
14
 
2. Research question 
The study seeks to establish whether the legal and institutional framework in the devolved local 
government system under the 2016 Constitution is consistent with principles of decentralisation 
and administrative autonomy. In answering this main question, the study will address the 
following sub-questions: 
a) What are the key design features of decentralisation and administrative autonomy which 
enable sub-national governments to play a pivotal role in the delivery of basic services 
effectively and efficiently? 
b) What kind of institutional arrangements must be made to capitalise on the benefits of 
administrative autonomy yet not suffer negative effects? 
c) How does the Zambian system of local government administration work and what 
challenges are experienced in practice? 
d) Why was the centralised system of local government administration adopted in Zambia? 
e) How does the centralised system of personnel administration impact on local authorities 
in terms of discharging their developmental mandate? 
 
                                                          
13
 Art 227 Constitution (Amendment) Act No.2. 
14
 Chigwata TC (2014) 279. 
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3. Argument for the research question 
The thesis argues that in order to enhance performance and service delivery, local governments 
should have the autonomy to determine their own organisational structures and exercise power to 
employ personnel a council needs. Therefore, it will be suggested that the precepts of 
decentralisation and administrative autonomy should be adhered to in order to build an efficient 
administration which responds to the needs of communities. However, institutional frameworks 
on decentralisation must be set within the boundaries of reasonable national limits to avoid the 
negative effects of administrative autonomy.  
It will be argued that the re-establishment of the LGSC in Article 228 of the 2016 Constitution 
has a number of implications. First, the establishment of the LGSC in Article 228 contradicts the 
principles and values of a devolved local system envisaged in Article 151 of the same 
constitution. Second, the functions of the LGSC constrain the administrative autonomy of local 
authorities thereby inhibiting service delivery and development. Third, the power conferred on 
the LGSC to appoint, transfer and discipline staff and setting of council’s internal procedures 
negatively impacts on the performance of councils. Therefore, as a result of increased control 
over sub-national governments by the centre, the national government has provided a weak 
decentralisation framework and restricted local autonomy, thereby negatively affecting service 
delivery.
15
 
4. Literature Review 
This section analyses literature that covers themes related to the main topic of this research. The 
available literature focuses on the principles of decentralisation which underpins the entire 
practice of how decentralised sub-national units enhance autonomy, accountability and 
development. For instance, Zahara claims that promoting social and economic development in 
matters of local government is only possible under a decentralised system which ensures 
“recognition of autonomy in administrative territorial units”.16 This line of reasoning is also 
echoed by Steytler and De Visser who argue that autonomy does not only provide democratic 
                                                          
15
 Madhekeni A Local multiparty democracy with no right to govern: The conundrum of constitutionalism in 
Namibia, Botswana and Zambia (unpublished PhD thesis, University of the Western Cape, 2016) 19. 
16
 Zahara P ‘Autonomy and decentralisation: Current priorities in the local public administration management’ vol 
2(14)   (2011) 288 Fascicle of the Faculty of Economics. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
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and accountable government for local communities, but also ensures the provision of services to 
communities in a sustainable manner.
17
 
Further, autonomy promotes the involvement of communities and community organisations in 
matters of local government.
18
 This view is supported by Shah who contends that a democratic 
and strong local government system enhances efficiency, responsiveness and accountability with 
a greater degree of autonomy and community participation.
19
 
In addition to autonomy and community participation, a decentralised local government system 
enhances the capacity of local authorities to initiate and plan for activities that foster local 
development. A number of scholars argued that there seems to be a connection between 
decentralisation and development. Scholars such as Ababio argue that having a decentralised 
local government system allows local authorities the autonomy to adapt their internal 
administrative procedures to the local environment whereas a centralised system tends to stifle 
local initiative.
20
 Further, Madhekeni contends that decentralising local government enhances 
development whereas centralisation of local government powers and functions is detrimental to 
development.
21
 Equally, Fessha and Kirkby submit that local government autonomy frees sub-
national units from reliance on the central government and its bureaucracy to implement their 
local policy decisions.
22
 Therefore, decentralisation enhances development at sub-national level 
whereas centralisation may pose challenges to development. It is therefore important to protect 
local government powers against centralisation in order to enhance development at sub-national 
level. 
In order to protect the powers and functions of sub-national units, the legal and institutional 
frameworks ought to be firmly entrenched in the constitution. Scholars such as Steytler and De 
Visser subscribe to the idea of entrenching the legal and institutional frameworks as a way of 
                                                          
17
 Steytler N & De Visser J Local Government Law of South Africa (2016) ch 8-5. 
18
 Steytler N & De Visser J (2016) ch 8-5. 
19
 Shah A (ed) Public service delivery (2006) 6. 
20
 Ababio EP ‘Decentralisation and devolution: what can Ghana and South Africa learn from each other? 5(1) (2014) 
35 Journal of Local Government Studies 24-40.   
21
 Madhekeni A (2017)19. 
22
 Fessha Y & Kirby C ‘A critical survey of subnational autonomy in African states’ Publius Vol 38, No. 2 (2008) 
248 -271. 
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countering centralisation of local government powers and functions by the national 
government.
23
 This is because constitutionally protected powers cannot easily be removed or 
amended by national legislation without amending the constitution itself.
24
 Equally, Chikulo also 
supports the idea of constitutionalising local government powers and functions as a way of 
deepening democracy and accountability.
25
  
In addition, Ababio submits that democratising local governments does not only deepen 
democracy and accountability but also enhances provision of services which are consistent with 
voter preferences.
26
  But does constitutionalising local government translate to an effective 
decentralised local government system capable of addressing developmental challenges? In this 
regard, the Zambian scenario, under the 2016 Constitution presents an interesting case which 
will be discussed in this thesis. 
With regard to the Zambian scenario, it is worth mentioning that no one has so far written on 
administrative autonomy under the 2016 Constitution with respect to decentralised local 
governance. Most scholars who have written on the subject of administrative autonomy based 
their research on the 1996 Constitution. For instance, scholars such as Chikulo wrote on 
institutional frameworks of democratising local governments
27
 while Mwasile focused on 
administrative autonomy with respect to human resource management.
28
 Another scholar who 
has written extensively on local government administration is Lolojih. However, his argument 
centres on the capacity of local authorities to offer good salaries and other conditions of 
service.
29
 Thus, there is no analytical literature written specifically on administrative autonomy 
under the 2016 Zambian Constitution. 
 
 
 
                                                          
23
 Steytler N & De Visser J (2016) ch5-5. 
24
 Steytler N & De Visser J (2016) ch5-5. 
25
 Chikulo BC ‘Local government reform in Zambia: A review’ 2009 Commonwealth Journal of local governance 
103. 
26
 Ababio EP (2014) 26. 
27
 Chikulo BC (2009)103. 
28
 Mwasile FB (2014) 127. 
29
 Lolojih PK ‘Local government and service delivery’ in Chitambo A 50 years of Local Government in Zambia: 
Treasuring the past, reflecting the present, shapping the future (2014)168. 
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5. Substantiating the argument 
This study is divided into five chapters. Chapter one is this introductory chapter which provides 
the background and problem statement, research questions, argument, literature review, 
methodology and terminologies that are going to be used in the research paper.  
Chapter Two will be a theoretical discussion on administrative autonomy in the context of the 
debates about decentralisation. The chapter will also focus on the advantages and disadvantages 
of administrative autonomy and institutional arrangements that should be made to capitalise on 
the benefits of administrative autonomy. 
Chapter Three will focus on the features of the Zambian system for local government 
administration within the context of civil service models, what model currently works and what 
the law and policy provides about how local government administrations are structured within 
the current model of civil service. Chapter four will discuss the relevant provisions of the 2016 
Constitution and Service Commissions Act of 2016 pertaining to administrative autonomy and 
also the general constitutional framework for local government, why it was adopted and to what 
extent it addresses the concerns expressed in Chapter Three. 
Chapter five will focus on the conclusion, major findings, recommendations and answering the 
research question. The chapter will suggest what needs to change to bring the legislation 
discussed in Chapters Three and Four in line with the Constitution. 
6. Research methodology 
This research is a desktop study which analyses different journal articles, chapters in books and 
books relating to decentralisation and administrative autonomy in local government. There will 
also be an analysis of the 2016 Zambian Constitution, the Local Government Act as well as 
relevant pieces of legislation applicable to local government. This approach will be used because 
the research is qualitative. 
7. Terminologies 
There are different contexts within which administrative autonomy may be measured. The 
contexts within which administrative autonomy may be measured include common themes of 
local governance, decentralisation, devolution, deconcentration and delegation. These terms are 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
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given different meanings depending on the context in which they are applied. Therefore, this 
section provides working definitions for these concepts including a definition of administrative 
autonomy and a brief analysis of the three systems of local government human resources. 
7.1 Local government 
According to Miller, local government is defined as “a sub-national level of government which 
has jurisdiction over a limited range of state functions, within a defined geographical area which 
is part of a large territory”.30 The sub-national government exercises some level of political, 
economic and administrative authority in order to effectively manage local affairs within the 
defined geographical area.
31
 Against this backdrop, local government is justified on the premise 
that local authorities are better placed to understand the problems and needs of communities they 
represent.
32
 
7.2. Decentralisation 
 Decentralisation requires the transfer of some degree of authority to sub-national governments. 
According to Rondinelli, decentralisation is defined as, 
“the transfer or delegation of legal and political authority to plan, make decisions and 
manage public functions from the central government and its agencies to field 
organizations of those agencies, subordinate units of government, semiautonomous 
public corporations, area wide or regional development authorities; functional authorities, 
autonomous local governments, or nongovernmental organizations.”33 
The objective of decentralisation stems from the need for the citizenry to exercise control over 
their local affairs and foster meaningful development.
34
 The degree of authority depends on the 
form of decentralisation adopted. The three forms of decentralisation that can be adopted are 
                                                          
30
 Miller KL Advantages and disadvantages of local government decentralisation/fiscal decentralisation (2002)3. 
31
 Miller KL (2002)3.  
32
 Zahara P (2011) 289. 
33
 Rondinelli DA Government Decentralization in Comparative Perspective: Theory and Practice in Developing 
Countries (1981) 137. 
34
 Councillors and Officers Orientation Manual (2016) 8. 
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16 | P a g e  
 
deconcentration, delegation and devolution.
35
 All these three forms are characterised by varying 
degrees of sub-national autonomy as explained below. 
7.2.1. Deconcentration 
Deconcentration is the weakest form of decentralisation.
36
 It refers to the transfer of 
administrative authority and decision-making from central government and its institutions to 
district or local offices working at local level.
37
 Under this form of decentralisation, employees 
working at the local level are accountable to the centre, usually through their respective 
ministries.
38
 The implication of deconcentration is that local governments operate essentially as 
agents of central government rather than as instruments of local self-expression.
39
 The problem 
with this system is that central government does not confer local governments with all the 
benefits and advantages of decentralisation.
40
 
7.2.2 Delegation 
Delegation is a more extensive form of decentralisation. Through delegation, central 
governments transfer responsibility for decision-making and administration of public functions 
to semi-autonomous organisation not wholly controlled by the central government, but ultimately 
accountable to it.
41
 Governments delegate responsibilities when they create public enterprises or 
or when they delegate to subnational units these organisations usually have a great deal of 
discretion in decision-making.
42
 
7.2.3 Devolution 
Devolution is by far the most ambitious and strongest form of decentralisation. A key feature of 
devolution is that national constitutions, rather than central government legislation establishes 
the framework for local government with regard to the extent of its governmental relations.
43
 As 
a result, devolved powers “cannot easily be removed or amended by provincial or national 
                                                          
35
 Litvack J & Seddon J (eds) Decentralization Briefing Notes WORLD BANK INSTITUTE Working Papers (2000) 
12. 
36
 Litvack J & Seddon J (eds) (2000) 12. 
37
 Arthur N & Gerk S Political accountability of decentralisation in Ghana- The unfinished business (2011) 11. 
38
 Arthur N & Gerk S (2011) 11. 
39
 Miller KL (2002) 4. 
40
 Miller KL (2002) 5. 
41
 Ministry of Local Government: Councillors and officers Orientation Manual (2016) 8. 
42
 Rondinelli D (1981) 3. 
43
 Ababio EP (2014) 29. 
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legislation and cannot be changed other than by an amendment to the constitution itself”.44 
Unlike the other two forms of decentralisation, more sub-national autonomy is said to prevail in 
devolved local government systems.
45
 Devolution is a key principle of administrative autonomy. 
7.3. Administrative autonomy 
Administrative autonomy refers to the [local authority’s] discretion to appoint, remunerate, 
discipline and dismiss staff as well as setting of internal administrative procedures.
46
 
Administrative autonomy may be analysed through three different local government human 
resources systems. The three different systems are the separate, integrated and unified systems. 
7.3.1. The separate system 
The separate system is when local governments have the right to choose their own staff. Under 
this system, each local government is a separate employer subject to national framework 
legislation.
47
Personnel are not transferable to other levels of government by a central body. The 
major disadvantage of this system is that poorer municipalities find it difficult to attract 
competent staff.
48
 
7.3.2. The integrated system 
The integrated system refers to a system in which local government officers are employed locally 
but are organised nationwide in a single national civil service.
49
 Unlike the separate system, staff 
under the integrated system can be transferred both to other local governments and to other 
government departments by bodies responsible for civil service as a whole.
50
 
                                                          
44
 Steytler N & De Visser J Local Government Law of South Africa (2016) ch 5-5. 
45
 Ababio EP (2014) 29. 
46
 Chigwata TC (2014) 69. 
47
 Cameron R Single public service study: Development of impact scenarios for integration of local government with 
the public service (2007) 8. 
48
 Cameron R (2007) 8. 
49
 Cameron R (2007) 8. 
50
 Cameron R (2007) 8. 
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However, this system is said to impact negatively on local government performance because 
accountability tends to be upwards to central government rather than to communities.
51
 It is also 
argued that countries that use the integrated system tend to have centralised governments with no 
strong tradition of decentralised local government.
52
 
7.3.3. The unified system  
The unified system of local government is an attempt to compromise between the two other 
approaches. It exists when local government staff is employed locally but can be transferred to 
other local governments only.
 53
 Cameron submits that where a unified system exists, it is often 
in respect of primarily senior local government employees.
54
 Therefore, the only difference 
between the unified system and the integrated system is that in the former, local government staff 
cannot be transferred to national government.
55
 
The advantage of the unified system is that it can help poorer municipalities attract staff but, 
unlike the integrated system, it would be staff with experience and commitment to the national 
government.
56
 The disadvantage would be that it is not as conducive to local government 
autonomy as the separate system as individual municipalities do not have control over the 
personnel conditions of their officials. The unified system is often used for centralised countries 
that wish to decentralise.
57
   
It is important to take into account the advantages and disadvantages of the local government 
human resources systems when analysing the extent of administrative autonomy within the 
context of decentralisation. This is because administrative autonomy is fundamental in the design 
of decentralisation. Thus, the next chapter presents a theoretical discussion on the relationship 
between decentralisation and administrative autonomy. The chapter argues that administrative 
autonomy should be seen as an essential component of decentralisation. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Decentralisation and administrative autonomy: A theoretical framework  
1. Introduction 
This Chapter presents a theoretical discussion on administrative autonomy within the context of 
the debates about decentralisation. In order to understand the connection between 
decentralisation and administrative autonomy, this Chapter makes reference to international 
literature on decentralisation and international best practice on the role of local government 
administration. The objective for such an enquiry is to develop a set of design features for an 
effective institutional arrangement that capitalises on the benefits of administrative autonomy 
while avoiding its negative effects. 
Against this backdrop, the chapter is divided into five sections. Section one is this introduction. 
Section Two discusses the advantages and disadvantages of decentralisation. Section Three 
focuses on the advantages and disadvantages of administrative autonomy. Section Four suggests 
institutional arrangements that must be made to capitalise on the benefits of administrative 
autonomy. Section Five is the conclusion of the central themes of administrative autonomy and 
decentralisation discussed in this chapter.   
2. Advantages and disadvantages of decentralisation 
Decentralisation is a very important process in enhancing local autonomy of sub-national 
governments as explained in Chapter One because it transfers some degree of authority to local 
authorities.
58
 But like any other process, the decentralisation process presents both opportunities 
and challenges. Thus, this section focuses on some of the advantages and disadvantages of 
decentralisation.  
2.1. Advantages of decentralisation  
Decentralisation has a number of advantages. Decentralisation increases government’s 
accountability by allowing wider political participation and thus contributing to better 
democratic governance.
59
 As such, presumed benefits of decentralisation become available to 
                                                          
58
 Zahara P (2011) 289.  
59
 Vezbergaite I Decentralisation policies, subnational autonomy and federal executive power: A comparison of 
Brazil and Mexico (2016) 56.  
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
20 | P a g e  
 
local populations when empowered local actors are downwardly accountable.
60
 In this way, 
citizens take charge of their government by monitoring and reviewing performance and reacting 
to underperformance through elections at both national and sub-national level.
61
 Thus, where 
political decentralisation allows for oversight by locally elected bodies, the need for re-election 
offers strong incentives for better performance.
62
Further, decentralisation has the potential to 
increase opportunities for greater participation and responsiveness of government to citizens 
because government decision-making is brought closer to citizens.
63
 Greater participation in 
public decision making is important because it improves equity and resource management.
64
 
Another advantage of decentralisation relates to overcoming the problem of bureaucracy. 
Decentralisation is seen as a means of circumventing the problem of red tape characteristic of 
centralised governments.
65
 As a result, decentralisation enhances service delivery by sub-national 
governments.
66
 But despite the positives of decentralisation, there are also arguments against 
decentralisation advanced by some scholars. 
2.2. Arguments against decentralisation 
One of the arguments against decentralisation is that it can lead to local state capture especially 
where systems of local accountability are weak. In view of this, Green argues that weak 
accountability and proximity may open the door to elite capture at the local level which can 
distort the benefits of decentralisation.
67
 Green further contends that when systems of local 
accountability are weak, “devolving authority and financial resources to local governments can 
lead to waste or misuse of public funds”.68 Therefore, it is important to have central government 
oversight mechanisms to reduce instances of wastage and misuse of public funds.  
The other disadvantage of decentralisation is that it can exacerbate inequality between 
jurisdictions. Inequalities between jurisdictions may be as result of differences in resources, 
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population sizes and economic activity.
69
 Resource-poor jurisdictions may find it difficult to 
raise as much revenue as richer jurisdictions, thereby increasing disparities between regions.
70
 As 
a result, local authorities in richer jurisdictions may be better able to attract the best skilled 
professionals with higher pay than those in poorer jurisdictions.
71
 
However, despite the arguments against decentralisation, it still remains a good strategy for 
fostering development at local level. Further, decentralisation is an essential component in the 
design of administrative autonomy in local governance. What is required is to design 
administrative within a good legal framework. Against this backdrop, the next section delves into 
the pros and cons of administrative autonomy. 
3. Administrative autonomy  
Administrative autonomy is an important measure of the degree of decentralisation
72
 and should 
therefore be seen as an essential component in the design of decentralised local government 
system. However, administrative autonomy should not be taken as a panacea to strengthen local 
government autonomy and accountability without evaluating how it poses a risk to 
decentralisation. Thus, this section focuses on how the concept of administrative autonomy 
supports and at the same time poses a danger to decentralisation.  
3.1. How administrative autonomy supports decentralisation 
The concept of administrative autonomy is integral to the manner in which decentralisation is 
conceived. Since decentralisation facilitates the development of functions at local level which 
cannot be performed by the centre,
73
 a significant degree of administrative autonomy is crucial.  
Administrative autonomy has key design features which include the power to determine internal 
administrative procedures and the discretion to appoint, remunerate, discipline and dismiss staff 
and monitoring and supervision as explained below. 
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3.1.1. Power to determine internal administrative procedures 
In terms of determining internal administrative procedures, decentralisation supports 
administrative autonomy by allowing sub-national units the flexibility to set up an organisational 
structure that is tailored to address the developmental plans and programmes of the actual needs 
existing in the council’s jurisdictions.74 In this way, local authorities can plan, initiate, 
coordinate, manage and execute policies in respect of all matters affecting the people within their 
areas.
75
 As such, implementation of local policies is locally directed and driven.
76
 But having 
power to determine internal procedures would be meaningless without having discretion over 
staff matters. 
3.1.2. Discretion to appoint, remunerate, discipline and dismiss staff 
With regard to staff matters, decentralisation supports administrative autonomy by allowing 
councils the discretion to appoint, remunerate, discipline and dismiss staff. Having control over 
local civil servants is essential to successful implementation of decentralisation because staff 
play a pivotal role in the delivery of essential public services to the people.
77
 Control over 
personnel promotes responsive service delivery and is necessary for enhancing accountability in 
service delivery.
 78
 With discretion to appoint staff, councils may have the leverage to hire and 
retain professionals whose skills align with planned activities tailored to suit local conditions and 
preferences.
 79
 On the other hand, lack of control over staff compromises accountability which is 
an important component of decentralisation. Thus, decentralisation “enables sub-national 
governments to render civil servants more accountable to the council and responsive to the 
aspirations of service users thereby promoting sufficient provision of service delivery”.80 
Further, autonomy over the appointment of staff helps to avoid the problem of divided loyalties
81
 
common in situations where the national government does the recruiting of employees who work 
at sub-national level.
82
 To this end, Chigwata argues that sub-national governments may not 
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effectively deliver on their mandate by using public sector employees whom they do not have 
control over.
83
 This is because a council cannot hold such employees to account for non-
performance.  
3.1.3. Monitoring and Supervision 
Connected to accountability is the aspect of monitoring and supervision. Decentralisation enables 
a local authority to supervise and monitor the performance of civil servants.
84
 As such, a local 
authority can be able to punish deficient performance through disciplinary measures or 
dismissals
85
 because employees are accountable to the appointing authority. 
Against this backdrop, it may be concluded that administrative autonomy is integral to the 
concept of decentralisation. The key design features of administrative autonomy may be difficult 
to realise without decentralisation facilitating the transfer of administrative authority and 
decision-making from central government to district or local offices.
86
 However, there are also a 
number of challenges with administrative autonomy which pose a danger to decentralisation. 
 3.2. Dangers of administrative autonomy 
There are several dangers to administrative autonomy which pose significant challenges for 
government performance in a decentralised setting. Some of the dangers include constricting 
interregional mobility of civil servants which have implications on national coverage of public 
services, nepotism, corruption and favouritism.
 87
 
3.2.1. Constricting interregional mobility of civil servants 
Administrative autonomy may constrict interregional mobility of civil servants and their career 
paths if there is no deliberate policy to recruit nationally. This may have implications on national 
coverage of public services because devolving authority for civil service management may make 
it difficult for local governments in poorer areas to compete with richer areas.
88
 Thus, national 
coverage of public services may suffer. This is because not all councils may be able to pay 
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salaries that are high enough to attract talent.
89
 As a result, a combination of low pay and 
difficult conditions in remote areas may create undesirable conditions for councils to attract 
high-quality staff. This may lead to further deterioration in conditions in poorer areas
90
  making 
it difficult to realise the benefits of decentralisation.
91
 
3.2.2. Nepotism, corruption and favouritism 
Decentralisation can lead to nepotism, corruption and favouritism. This may be the case where 
critical checks and balances to protect the professionalism of civil servants are not in place.
92
 
Local government officers may be rewarding family members and supporters with coveted 
positions at the expense of meritocracy and professionalism.
93
 In the absence of a policy to 
recruit nationally, there is a danger that some [councils] may engage in preferential treatment of 
“sons of the soil,” or discrimination based on ethnicity, religion, or other special interests.94 
Thus, devolving the power of appointing staff to local authorities could easily be abused if 
mechanisms are not available to balance the appointment of competent personnel and monitoring 
the performance of employees.
95
 Therefore, it is important to adjust decentralisation by 
formulating legal frameworks that clearly define responsibilities and standards to realise the 
benefits of administrative autonomy and mitigate the negative effects of decentralisation. 
4. Institutional frameworks for effective administrative autonomy 
Flowing from the preceding discussion, this section outlines some of the institutional 
arrangements that can be considered to capitalise on the benefits of administrative autonomy and 
minimise negatives. The institutional arrangements speak to the power to determining own 
organisational structure, power to hire, oversee, and discipline own personnel, capacity building, 
power to set salary levels, flexible institutional framework and supervision framework and 
reporting mechanisms.  
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4.1. The power to determine own organisational structure 
The institutional framework should allow local authorities the power to determine their own 
organisational structure. Allowing local authorities to determine their organisational structure is 
important for councils to design structures that serve the specific needs of each local authority. 
This frees local governments from relying on the national government to implement their local 
policy decisions.
96
 However, determining an organisational structure must be done within the 
boundaries of reasonable national limits to avoid the negative effects of administrative 
autonomy. The same principle applies to the power to hire and fire staff. 
4.2. Power to hire, oversee, and discipline their own personnel. 
The power to determine an organisation structure to serve specific needs would not bear the 
desired fruits without the power to hire and fire. Local authorities must therefore, have the power 
to hire personnel to put into their own organisational structure and to oversee, discipline and 
reward their own personnel. In addition, the legal framework on administrative autonomy should 
address issues pertaining to appointment of staff and compensation schemes through 
performance agreements, employment contracts and performance appraisals. In this way, local 
authorities will be able to reward good performance through pay increases, promotions, and 
other benefits based on performance appraisal without necessarily having to rely on central 
government.
97
  This will encourage employees to meet performance targets.
98
 
In addition, it is imperative to design the institutional framework in such a way that recruitment 
of staff does not increase interregional inequalities.
99
 This can be done in several ways. One of 
the ways is to advertise vacancies nationally. The other strategy would be to allow local 
governments to set hiring levels.
100
 Further, local authorities can be given block grants for their 
own capacity-building training programs to address the skills gap across local authorities.
101
 But 
more importantly is the discretion to determine salary levels. 
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4.3. Power to set salary levels 
Autonomy to set salary levels is important in attracting qualified personnel. Therefore, local 
government should have something to offer, through competitive pay, career opportunities, 
prestige, or other incentives.
102
 Thus, local authorities should design and formulate financial and 
managerial mechanisms to set competitive compensation packages and salary levels capable of 
attracting local talent needed in order to deliver quality services to citizens. However, in 
establishing salary schemes, it is important that the national government sets the framework 
within which sub-national governments may determine salary levels for their employees to avoid 
corruption, resource wastage and inflation. Also, care must be taken to ensure that the “national 
standards do not place unrealistic financial burdens on local governments”.103 
4.4. Flexible institutional framework 
The institutional framework must be flexible enough to avoid a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach so 
that it allows for differentiation between weaker and stronger local governments. For instance, 
sub-national governments which have the capacity to attract and retain qualified personnel can 
be allowed to have full competency over staff appointments.
104
 For those councils which might 
experience difficulties in attracting and retaining skilled manpower, the institutional framework 
should establish a deployment system where the national government deploys some of its skilled 
employees to sub-national governments
105
 even though this may imply having less autonomy. 
However, flexibility must be exercised within national standards to avoid the negative effects of 
administrative autonomy.
106
 
4.5. Capacity building 
The national government can support the capacity of local authorities through formulating 
capacity building, support, and national skills development frameworks. Where talent and skills 
are lacking at the local level, an elaborate national training programme should be formulated in 
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the legal framework to build the necessary capacity that ensures that relevant skills are present 
locally in all regions.
107
  
4.6. Supervision framework and reporting mechanisms 
The legal framework should have a supervision framework that includes monitoring as well as 
intervention especially where the necessary capacity in terms of talent and skills are lacking at 
the local level. The national government should be able to somehow intervene when local 
authorities abuse their administrative autonomy. In addition, the legal framework should clearly 
define reporting mechanisms on personnel matters to senior governments to enable oversight. 
However, to achieve these benefits, accountability frameworks must be robust enough to prevent 
inefficiency and mismanagement.
108
 
5. Concluding remarks  
The Chapter discussed the theoretical framework of administrative autonomy in the context of 
the debates about decentralisation. It was argued that strong decentralised systems of local 
government, with the enjoyment of administrative autonomy enhance efficiency, responsiveness 
and accountability. As a result, administrative autonomy should be seen as an essential 
component in the design of decentralisation.  
In addition, it was also discussed that administrative autonomy presents advantages which may 
serve to strengthen local government accountability and increase local control. At the same time, 
administrative autonomy has disadvantages which relate to constricting interregional mobility 
and thereby threatening national coverage of public services. The other disadvantage relates to 
creating a fertile environment for increasing nepotism, favouritism and corruption. This may be 
the case where critical checks and balances to protect the neutrality and independence of civil 
servants are not in place. It was therefore, argued that opportunities and challenges of 
administrative autonomy should be weighed when designing decentralisation policies. 
The chapter further argued that since administrative autonomy is an integral part of 
decentralisation, several institutional arrangements need to be considered to capitalise on the 
benefits of administrative autonomy. With regard to performance appraisals, it was contended 
that having adequate institutional frameworks would enable local authorities to reward good 
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performance through pay increases, promotions, and other benefits without necessarily having to 
rely on central government. Further, it was argued that formulating necessary legal frameworks 
can help local authorities to set competitive compensation packages and salary levels capable of 
attracting local talent by designing and formulating financial and managerial mechanisms needed 
to deliver quality services to citizens. 
Moreover, the institutional framework must be flexible enough to avoid a ‘one-size-fits-all’ 
approach. This would help establish a deployment system where the national government 
deploys some of its skilled employees to sub-national governments and reduce interregional 
inequalities. In cases where talent and skills are lacking at the local level, an elaborate national 
training programme should be formulated in the legal framework to build the necessary capacity 
that ensures that relevant skills are present locally in all regions. This may help to reduces 
chances of interregional inequalities. Where the necessary capacity in terms of talent and skills 
are lacking at the local level, the legal framework should have a supervision framework that 
includes monitoring as well as intervention to ensure that national standards are adhered to. 
However, the institutional framework must take into account the boundaries of reasonable 
national limits to avoid the negative effects of administrative autonomy. 
Therefore, it can be argued that decentralisation and administrative autonomy have a bearing on 
effective service delivery. It is no wonder that the features of decentralisation and administrative 
autonomy are what essentially informed the provisions on devolved local government system in 
the 2016 Zambian Constitution. Against this backdrop, the following Chapter describes key 
features of the system for local government administration in Zambia since independence.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
Features of the Zambian system for local government administration 
1. Introduction 
From the time Zambia attained political independence from Britain in 1964, the commitment to 
decentralisation and popular participation has been an important component of local government 
reform strategies.
109
 Since 1964, local authorities have given considerable attention to the 
important role that human resource management plays in meeting service provision 
obligations.
110
 
Against this backdrop, this chapter discusses the key features of the local government 
administration in Zambia within the context of civil service models. This chapter is largely 
descriptive, and divided into four sections. Section one is this introduction. Section two presents 
a brief history of local government administration before and after independence and traces the 
evolution of the civil service models of local government administration. Section three discusses 
the legal framework and functions of the LGSC. Section four is the conclusion. 
2. Local government administration in Zambia 
Local government administration in Zambia can be divided into two broad categories: the pre-
independence and post-independence periods. The changing political and socio-economic 
context in the pre-independence and post-independence periods has impacted the development of 
local government administration. Hence, this section highlights the major developments in local 
government administration in Zambia before and after independence beginning with the pre-
independence period. 
2.1. Local government administration before independence 
Before the Europeans arrived in the country, chiefs and headmen together, exercised the powers 
of government both nationally throughout their areas and locally within the boundaries of each 
village. In most cases, the authority of chiefs depended largely on factors of personality and 
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military strength.
 111
  The more powerful a chief was, the larger the area he or she governed with 
defined tribal boundaries.
 112
 To help chiefs administer tribal boundaries, advisors and headmen 
were appointed by the chief.
113
 
The advisors or hereditary councillors were based at the chiefs’ headquarters and their primary 
role was to advise the chiefs on various affairs of the tribe pertaining to administration and 
service provision. At village level, the responsibility of administering the village was given to 
headmen. The village headmen were responsible for relaying the chief’s wishes to the 
inhabitants.
114
 In addition, the village headmen ensured that each village and family provided its 
own services. Under this traditional administration, only major services such as defending the 
village against invasion by enemies required the co-operation of the whole village or tribe.
115
 
This traditional administration was practised for many years until the British South Africa 
Company (BSAC) took over the administration of chiefdoms and subsequently changed the 
traditional administration.
 116
 
The BSAC introduced direct rule in local level administration from 1911 to 1924. The policy of 
direct rule considerably reduced the powers of local chiefs as they now depended on 
administrative officers.
 117
 Under this policy, native commissioners and administrative officers 
appointed by the BSAC were made responsible for nearly every aspect of local administration 
and carried out the work that chiefs used to do.
118
 The position of chief was further weakened by 
the enactment of the Administration of Natives Proclamation in 1916.
119
 This Proclamation made 
provisions for the appointment and dismissal of recognised chiefs and chiefs and headmen even 
faced disciplinary action if they failed to carry out orders.
120
 The Proclamation further made 
Native Commissioners responsible for the general control of their districts. From the way the 
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direct rule was administered, it may be argued that it was a form of centralised administration 
because it depended on a heavy concentration of administrative officers in the rural areas.
121
  
The direct rule system had two major drawbacks; first, it did not allow local people to participate 
in local administration and second, it was costly to operate.
122
 Due to these drawbacks, the 
system of administration changed from direct rule to indirect rule in 1924 when the 
administration of Northern Rhodesia, modern day Zambia’s territory, passed from the BSAC to 
the British Government. 
Under the indirect rule, the British government administered the indigenous people through the 
political systems of the indigenous people.
123
 Under the indirect rule, chiefs assumed new 
responsibilities. To facilitate colonial control of the indigenous people, the British government 
appointed District and Provincial Commissioners to act as middlemen between the indigenous 
people with their chiefs as principal executive officers.
124
 Whereas the direct rule was found to 
be expensive due to huge sums that were required to pay salaries of European officials,
125
 the 
indirect rule was perceived by the British Government to be a more flexible, progressive and 
cheap policy than the direct rule policy. Under the indirect rule, legislation and execution of 
policies and by-laws was carried out in accordance with the wishes of the colonial government. 
Local chiefs were only required to ensure that policies of the colonial government were carried 
out in accordance with African laws and customs.
126
 Thus, the British government let Africans 
take part in ruling themselves at local level by setting up native authorities especially in rural 
areas though subject to the supervision and control of district officers.  
Conversely, in urban areas, the British operated a direct rule system were participation in local 
governance was, by and large, extended to whites only. The direct rule system was imposed 
because at the time urban local governments were being established, Europeans had economic 
interest in these areas.
127
 Because of the economic interests in urban areas, Europeans 
endeavoured to control the system of local governance in these areas. In essence, the direct and 
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indirect rule systems were a depiction of the unified and separate systems of local governance 
defined in chapter one.  
Under the direct rule, for instance, each local government was a separate employer subject to 
national framework legislation whereas the indirect rule required that local government staff 
were employed locally but organised nationwide as part of a central local government civil 
service. The features of direct and indirect rule systems were so entrenched that they 
characterised the system of local government administration in the post-independent Zambia. For 
instance, the unified system adopted in 1964 had features of the direct rule system whereas the 
separate and integrated systems had characteristics of the indirect rule as will be explained 
below. 
2.2. Local government between independence and the 2016 Constitution 
After gaining independence from Britain in 1964, the national government designed and 
implemented a decentralised system of local government to facilitate wider participation by the 
citizenry in development and service delivery.
128
 In order to achieve this objective, the 
government enacted the Local Government Act of 1965. The Local Government Act created 
councils with elected representatives controlling local government at district level.
 129
 The 
government instituted a number of local government reforms which have had implications on the 
civil service systems for local government administration. 
As earlier explained in Chapter One, civil service systems that may be adopted include the 
separate, unified and integrated systems.
130
  In the case of Zambia, the country employed all the 
three major types at different times from 1964 to 2016.
131
 Thus, the following sub-sections 
address the local government civil service models as they evolved from 1964 to 2016 and why 
they were abandoned. The first model discussed is the separate system adapted from 1964 to 
1965. 
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2.2.1. 1964 to 1965: Separate administrations 
In 1964, Zambia employed the separate personnel system in which councils were administered. 
Under this system, Municipal and Township Councils employed their own staff.
132
  The 
departmental layout of local authorities was determined by statute which differed according to 
categories of local authorities that existed ranging from city, municipal to township councils.
133
 
The departmental layout was to some extent linked to the core functions of each category of 
councils. Under the separate system, city, municipal and township councils had more functions 
to perform than councils in rural areas. The city, municipal and township councils were 
responsible for electricity, street lighting, water and sewerage; refuse disposal and housing 
whereas the functions of rural councils were restricted to construction and maintenance of feeder 
roads, markets, bridges and environmental health services.
134
 The differences in functions had a 
bearing on the kind of employees to be appointed especially at senior management level. 
In city and municipal councils, for instance, the head of administration was the Town Clerk, who 
by statute, was supposed to be a lawyer.
135
 Conversely, in township and rural councils the chief 
executive and administrative officers were Township and Council Secretaries respectively who 
required no legal background.
136
 The officer responsible for financial accounting functions was 
the City Treasurer for cities and the Municipal Treasurer for municipalities. The City and 
Municipal Treasurer was required to be a qualified accountant, preferably with the qualification 
of the Institute of Municipal Treasurers and Accountants. In contrast, the chief financial officers 
or treasurers in rural councils were only required to have basic accounting qualifications.
137
 But 
despite the differences in the qualifications of personnel required, the separate system of local 
governance practiced in both urban and rural areas guaranteed administrative autonomy and 
accountability over council staff matters. Under the separate system, each council had the 
freedom to plan its human resource requirements in accordance with its needs.
138
  
                                                          
132
 Mwasile FB (2014) 118. 
133
 Mwasile FB (2014) 118. 
134
 Mwasile FB (2014) 118. 
135
 Mwasile FB (2014) 119. 
136
 Mwasile FB (2014) 119. 
137
 Mwasile FB (2014) 119. 
138
 Mwasile FB (2014) 123. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
34 | P a g e  
 
The separate system initially worked well and smoothly as the established order of human 
resource management from 1964 to 1965 until critical shortages of qualified staff was 
experienced towards the end of 1964. The system of local government experienced an exodus of 
professionally and technically qualified personnel, who were mainly expatriate officers from 
Britain.
139
 The mass exodus of expatriates such as lawyers, engineers, accountants and public 
health personnel created a general deficiency in critical departments of local authorities and 
adversely affected service delivery.
140
  
But despite the need to fill the void left by expatriates, many of the councils could not however 
immediately replace the expatriates for two main reasons; first there were few graduates at 
independence and second, many of them had no capacity to recruit suitably qualified 
professionals.
141
 Since no local authority, individually, had the capacity to go out and recruit 
professionally and technically qualified personnel, the Ministry of Local Government and 
Housing (MLGH), towards the end of 1964, decided to establish a recruitment panel for local 
authorities’ staff as a way of solving the problem of staff shortages.142 The recruitment panel was 
meant to act as an employment agency for local authorities and its membership included 
councillors and officials nominated by the Local Government Association of Zambia (LGAZ) 
from its constituent member local authorities.
143
 The recruitment panel became operational in 
1965.  
2.2.2. 1965 to 1980: Unified administration  
In 1965 the country adopted a unified local government system of administering local authorities 
under the auspices of the LGSC.
144
 This essentially meant that local government staff were 
employed locally but organised nationwide as part of a central local government civil service. In 
this system of local government administration, all council employees formed a single career 
service, covering the whole country which was centrally controlled by LGSC.
145
  Initially, the 
LGSC operated on a part-time basis from 1965 to 1975 before a full-time one was appointed. 
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2.2.2.1. 1965 to 1975:   Part-time LGSC  
The Local Government (officers) Act Cap 477 of 1965 established a part-time LGSC with 
limited powers. For example, the LGSC had powers to determine the salaries, salary structures 
and other conditions of service for council employees.
146
 The LGSC also determined the 
qualifications for specified officers such as Town Clerks, City Treasurers and Engineers in city 
and municipal councils and Town Secretaries in township councils.
147
 The LGSC further 
determined the tenure of office, duties and functions of officers and dealt with staff disciplinary 
appeals as an appellate body.
148
 In addition, the Minister of Local Government established the 
Local Government Service Boards (LSGBs) in rural areas which performed similar functions to 
those of the part-time LGSC.
149
 
However, the part-time LGSC had restricted and limited powers in terms of staff appointments. 
The LGSC did not appoint officers but only approved appointments.
150
 The function of 
recruitment and training of staff still remained with individual local authorities. As a result of 
these restrictive and limited powers, there were many delays on the issuance of determinations 
and rulings on cases submitted to the LGSC by councils which resulted in dissatisfaction on the 
part of local government staff. 
151
 Thus, the general view of local authorities’ officials was that 
the LGSC was not effectively discharging its functions due to its part-time nature. The 
deficiencies of the part-time LGSC prompted the Government to enact the Local Government 
Service Commission (LGSC) Act in 1974. The enactment of the LGSC Act resulted in the 
establishment of a full-time LGSC.
152
 
2.2.2.2. 1975 to 1980: Full-time LGSC 
The full-time LGSC was appointed by the President under the LGSC Act. Unlike the part-time 
LGSC, the full-time LGSC instituted in 1975 was given more powers. The Commission was 
empowered to appoint, transfer and discipline officers including regulating the conditions of 
service.
153
 Further, the full-time LGSC’s ambit of responsibility encompassed councils not only 
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in urban areas but also in rural areas and essentially abolished the LGSBs.
154
 However; the 
powers conferred on the full-time LGSC had some drawbacks on the autonomy and 
accountability of local authorities. 
The major drawback of the full-time LGSC under the unified system was that local authorities no 
longer had the power to appoint and discipline their own staff.
155
  Further, personnel tended to 
owe their allegiance to the appointing authorities and not to respective councils they worked 
for.
156
 Apart from restricting the autonomy and accountability of local authorities, there were 
also cases of abuse of authority. 
The LGSC sometimes abused its authority by transferring, promoting or employing personnel 
without due regard to the financial burden on councils.
157
 Chongwe summed up the operations of 
the full-time LGSC as an “antithesis to the idea of conferring autonomy on the council”.158 
Following the challenges in the operations of the LGSC, the Government decided to introduce 
changes in the local government laws in 1980 which essentially established an integrated civil 
service system model.
159
 
2.2.3. 1981 to 1986: One party system and integrated administration  
In 1980, the country repealed the 1965 Local Government Act and the LGSC Act of 1974 in a 
bid to improve the administration of local authorities. In its place, the national government 
enacted the Local Administration Act No 15 of 1980.
160
 The Local Administration Act 
introduced a number changes in the system of local governance. First, the Act changed the 
system from local government to local administration and local authorities became agents of the 
party and its government.
161
 The change from local government to local administration 
essentially meant that councillors were no longer voted upon by the people but appointed by the 
government. Second, personnel of the National Civil Service and the Local Government Service 
were integrated to form one civil service. Third, personnel of local government and central 
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government were integrated into the ruling party, the United National Independence Party 
(UNIP).
162
 The integration of the party and government followed the change in the political 
scene in 1972 with the declaration of the one party state in which no other party, apart from 
UNIP, could exist. Thus, the central and local government administration was merged with UNIP 
structures to create an integrated administration in order to improve coordination and eliminate 
of duplication among them.
163
 Fourth, the Act introduced changes at senior administrative level, 
system of paying salaries and disciplinary procedures. For instance, all Town Clerks and Council 
Secretaries became “District Executive Secretaries” whilst Chief Officers or directors became 
“Secretaries” in respect of their functions.164 The salaries of all council officers were paid by 
central government.
165
 With regard to disciplinary matters, all discipline and appeals 
responsibilities fell under Provincial Local Government Boards.
166
 
Fifth, the Act also introduced changes to the political system of councils. The Act abolished the 
elections and posts of mayors and council chairmen and in their place created the posts of district 
governors and district executive secretaries respectively.
167
 The district governors and executive 
secretaries were powerful political figures that were directly appointed by the President and 
enjoyed direct patronage from the President as did the other political officers.
168
  Thus, the 1980 
reforms created an institutional synthesis between local government, central government and the 
party, establishing a single administrative agency.
169
 
The single administrative agency called the district council was established in each district under 
the chairmanship of the District Governor.
170
 Under this arrangement, local authorities remained 
as statutory, deliberative and consultative bodies concerned with the determination of broad 
policy objectives and critical assessment of development programmes.
171
 The developmental 
programmes local authorities were involved in included provision of housing, land-use planning, 
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construction and maintenance of roads, provision of markets and water supply to residents in 
their areas.
172
 
But despite having a single administrative agency and local authorities playing a critical role in 
developmental programmes, the integrated system also had its own flaws. It is argued that since 
the distinction between civil servants and politicians was blurred under the integrated system, 
political bias in most development ventures and party corruption in the allocation of 
development funds was the order of the day.
173
 Further, contracts were being given on patronage 
rather than competence thereby creating tension between qualified staff and councillors due to 
bureaucratic in-fighting coupled with overlapping of functions.
174
 This situation adversely 
affected the local authorities’ efficiency and effectiveness in service delivery. Consequently, the 
government was forced to amend the Local Government Act in 1986 to provide for a separate 
personnel civil service model for each council.
175
 
2.2.4. 1986 to 1991: Separate administration  
The enactment of the Local Government (Amendment) Act in 1986 provided for a separate 
personnel civil service model.
176
 Under this system, councils were conferred with administrative 
autonomy of hiring, remunerating and firing their personnel.
177
 As a consequence, council 
personnel were no longer transferable to any other body outside the council that employed 
them.
178
 
Although the separate system was enacted from 1986 until 1991, it was never fully implemented 
because of the challenges posed by this personnel system. For instance, small district councils 
were unable to attract qualified staff or to train their own personnel and there was a lack of clear 
personnel policies, poor personnel management and over-staffing, especially in the middle and 
lower management cadres.
179
 As a result, there were critical shortages of skilled and qualified 
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manpower in most councils,.
180
 In addition, there were no career prospects for personnel 
especially in rural councils.
181
  
Moreover, the political landscape in the late 1980s became volatile due to economic hardships 
and lack of service delivery by councils which were run by UNIP. This heightened 
discontentment among the people resulting in several strikes and violent protests in the 
country.
182
 
The extensive protests made the ruling party UNIP under Kaunda, to realise the growing 
opposition to UNIP's monopoly on power and the need for reform. As a result, Kaunda promised 
a referendum on multiparty democracy and lifted the ban on political parties by amending the 
Constitution in 1990.
183
 The amendment to the Constitution saw the creation of the Movement 
for Multiparty Democracy (MMD), a movement mainly composed of trade unionists, political 
activists and civil society organisations which strongly opposed the one party system. After 
October 1991, the country transitioned from a one-party state to a multi-party system of 
government.  
The multiparty system of government had implications on the administration of local authorities. 
The transition set in motion the process of de-linking local government administration from 
central government and the ruling party by enacting the Local Government Act 1991.
184
 The 
Local Government Act (No. 22) of 1991 essentially repealed the 1980 Local Administration Act 
(No.15) and re-introduced the distinction between the ruling party, the central government and 
local government.
185
 The 1991 Act also provided for changes in the system and type of councils 
by establishing an integrated system of local government administration. 
2.2.5. 1991 to 1996: Integrated administrations 
The 1991 Act provided for an integrated three-tier system of local government comprising three 
types of councils namely, city, municipal and district councils.
186
 The larger district councils 
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were designated as City Councils with the Mayor as the political head and the Town Clerk or 
Principal Officer as the administrative head. City Councils were followed by Municipal Councils 
also headed by Mayors and Town Clerks while smaller rural councils were simply called District 
Councils headed by council chairpersons as political heads and council secretaries as 
administrative heads.  The three-tier system and the type of councils had implications on the 
autonomy of the local government system. 
The Local Government Act of 1991 sought to convert local government into a fully-fledged 
autonomous local government system by democratising local government and introducing 
representative local councils.
187
 The Act also introduced measures to strengthen democratic 
control over administration and increased accountability to democratically elected bodies.
188
 
The Act further conferred powers on the Minister of Local Government to make local 
government service regulations, establish and appoint the LGSC and its Commissioners and 
determine the functions of the LGSC.
189
 Clearly, these reforms gave the Minister complete 
power to change the way staff were regulated in the local government service such as 
appointments, transfers and internal procedures. The excessive ministerial powers in the 
administration of local authorities contained in the Act raised concerns among key stakeholders 
in local governance such as the LGAZ and the Zambia United Local Authorities Workers Union 
(ZULAWU).
190
 
Between 1993 and 1994, the view was strongly expressed by both the LGAZ and ZULAWU that 
the LGSC be separately established under the Commission’s Act. The idea behind this was that 
the excessive power which the Minister of Local Government exerted over the appointments of 
LGSC Commissioners and appointment of council staff and transfers would be reduced.
191
 
Subsequently, the 1991 Act was amended in 1995. The amendment to the Act saw local 
government reverting back to the separate system in order to circumvent the challenges 
experienced with the integrated system.  
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2.2.6. 1996 to 2010:  Separate administration  
By 1996, the integrated system of local government had reverted to the separate system. This 
followed the dissolution of the LGSC and the subsequent issuance of Statutory Instrument (SI) 
No. 115 of 1996
192
 which conferred wide ranging administrative powers on councils. Councils 
were empowered to appoint, dismiss, promote and establish offices without seeking authority 
from central government.
193
 Further, the statutory instrument stipulated that all appointments of 
council staff had to be done through the Establishment Committee of the council composed of 
elected councillors.
194
 With regard to staff discipline, the statutory instrument provided for 
Provincial Service Boards to review disciplinary cases and hear appeals from aggrieved 
officers.
195
 But despite the wide ranging administrative powers conferred on councils during this 
period, the separate system operated between 1996 and 2010 had one major drawback pertaining 
to abuse of power to hire and fire by elected councillors. For instance, Mwasile argues that under 
the separate system some elected officials abused the powers vested in them to the dissatisfaction 
of most local government officers by employing relatives and friends without due regard to 
qualifications.
196
  Further, officers were often fired by councillors even on flimsy grounds. 
Following complaints regarding abuse of powers by councillors to hire and fire, the Ministry of 
Local Government and Housing (MLGH) appointed a technical team in 2009 to consider ways 
and means of addressing the problem of abuse of power by councillors. The committee 
recommended the re-establishment of the LGSC.
197
 Based on the recommendations of the 
technical committee, the Local Government (Amendment) Act No. 6 of 2010 was enacted that 
re-established the LGSC and reverted to a unified local government system for the fourth time.
198
 
2.2.7. 2010 to 2016: Unified administration  
The Local Government (Amendment) Act No. 6 of 2010 provided for the re-introduction of the 
LGSC.
199
 The decision to re-establish the LGSC and keeping local civil servants under the 
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umbrella of a central direction was based on a number of advantages. First, as other scholars 
have noted, keeping the local civil service under the umbrella of central direction meant 
standardisation in working conditions across the country.
200
 Otherwise, local governments in 
poorer areas would have found it difficult to compete with richer areas, thereby affecting 
national coverage of public services. 
Second, central government’s involvement in staffing was viewed to be crucial in career 
prospects of staff. This was because central government would have expanded civil servants’ 
career paths by opening channels between local and central employment.
201
 Further, the centre 
would have retained control over hiring.
202
 
Third, settling of pay levels nationally was thought to be a good way of circumventing the 
competition between local authorities for staff in short supply. Having a centralised organ to 
regulate pay schemes was viewed as the best way to harmonise salaries and conditions of 
service.
203
 The implication of the standardised pay was that staff would now be motivated to 
work in any part of the country.  Salary levels would have been artificially enhanced if national 
standards were not settled and generally adhered to. Further, standardised pay structures would 
have shielded sub-national governments from local pressure to overspend on wages and salaries 
and promoted the movement of good officers between local authorities to widen their experience 
and to fit the best of them for the highest posts. 
Fourth and most importantly, the re-establishment of the LGSC would provide security of tenure 
for members of staff against unfair dismissal from employment by councillors who were 
perceived to be abusing their powers of hiring and firing.
204
 Based on these advantages, re-
establishment of the LGSC seemed to be a viable option in mitigating favouritism, nepotism and 
corruption in the operations of councils.
205
 Against this backdrop, the Local Government 
(Amendment) Act No. 6 of 2010 was enacted.
 
The 2010 Local Government (Amendment) Act 
empowered the LGSC to perform several functions as explained below. 
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3. Composition, powers and functions of the LGSC in the Local Government (Amendment) 
Act No. 6 of 2010 Act. 
The LGSC under the 2010 Act consisted of five full-time members appointed by the President. 
The members included the Chairperson, the Vice Chairperson and three other members.
206
 The 
Act empowered the LGSC to appoint, re-grade and discipline employees in the Local 
Government Service.
207
 Further, the LGSC was conferred with the power to determine 
transfers
208
 and secondments of council staff.
209
 The Commission was further mandated to 
authorise the withholding, reduction, deferment or suspension of salaries of employees in the 
Local Government Service. Thus, the 2010 Local Government Act had implications on the 
administrative autonomy of local authorities. The 2010 Local Government Act was bolstered by 
the enactment of the 2016 Constitution with most of the functions of the LGSC retained in the 
Constitution. 
4. Conclusion 
The Chapter described key features of the Zambian system for local government administration 
from independence in 1964 to 2016. The chapter argued that Zambia has struggled with the issue 
of administrative autonomy. The country has meandered from the separate to a unified and 
integrated administrations and gone back and forth from 1964 to 2016 in an effort to make local 
government democratic and ensure that relevant personnel policies are developed. 
The chapter also discussed the powers and functions of the LGSC as operated under the 2010 
Local Government Amendment Act before the enactment of the 2016 Constitution. It was 
observed that under the 2010 Act, Zambia operated a unified model in devolved local 
government system and the LGSC was given more powers and functions to administer staff 
matters than before. The LGSC was empowered to manage human resource matters in local 
authorities such as appointing, confirming, and promoting and hear appeals of all local 
government officers except for general workers classified as division IV employees. It was 
observed that all the powers of the LGSC were subsequently entrenched in the 2016 Constitution 
with implications on administrative autonomy. Thus, the next chapter analyses and reflects on 
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the extent to which the 2016 Constitution impacts on the administrative autonomy of local 
authorities. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Administrative autonomy in the 2016 Zambian Constitution 
1. Introduction 
This Chapter focuses on administrative autonomy in the 2016 Zambian Constitution. The chapter 
discusses the general constitutional framework for local government, why it was adopted and to 
what extent it addresses the concerns pertaining to administrative autonomy discussed in Chapter 
Two.  
In order to adequately address the concerns of administrative autonomy, the chapter is divided 
into five sections. The first section consists of this introduction.  The second section provides the 
background to the enactment of the 2016 Constitution. Section three presents the relevant 
provisions of the 2016 Constitution pertaining to local government administration. The fourth 
section focuses on the Constitutional provisions and legislation pertaining to functions of the 
LGSC in respect to administrative autonomy. Section five reflects on the functions of the LGSC. 
Finally, the sixth section is the conclusion which summarises the important points discussed in 
this chapter. 
2. Background to the 2016 constitutional amendment 
Before analysing some of the provisions on local government administration in the 2016 
Constitution, it is important to provide a background to the enactment of the 2016 Constitution. 
By 2011, there was growing discontentment among people with regard to the failure by the 
MMD government to enact a new constitution which guaranteed fundamental human rights and 
principles of decentralisation. The failure to enact a new constitution led to the defeat of the 
ruling MMD by the Patriotic Front (PF) in the 2011 general elections.
210
 The PF, led by Micheal 
Sata, promised to, among other things; enact a new constitution that would guarantee 
fundamental human rights, rule of law and a decentralisation system of governance.
211
 To 
actualise the dream of a new constitution, President Sata immediately constituted a Technical 
Committee to consider the recommendations of all previous Constitution Commissions.
 212
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Unfortunately, President Sata died in 2014 before the conclusion of the constitution making 
process. 
Following the death of Michael Sata in November 2014, the Constitution was amended and 
enacted in January 2016.
213
 The amended Constitution provided for, among other things, values 
and principles of devolution to guide local government administration.
214
 The provisions on 
devolved local government system have had implications on the autonomy of local authorities as 
explained below. 
3. Relevant provisions on local government autonomy  
The 2016 Zambian Constitution promotes democratic and accountable exercise of power
 
in 
administering districts in addition to encouraging the involvement of communities in local 
government matters. Thus, the Constitution entrenches the democratic nature of local 
government, their powers, financial powers and prohibitions to interfere as discussed below. 
3.1. Democratic nature of local government 
A democratic local government system is one of the cornerstones of the 2016 Constitution. Thus, 
Article 147 of the Constitution provides for a powerful, democratic and autonomous devolved 
system of local government.
215
 Similarly, Article 151 provides that the local government system 
shall promote democratic and accountable exercise of power and foster national unity.
216
 In order 
to promote democratic and accountable exercise of power, the Constitution explicitly states that 
the management and administration of the political, social, legal and economic affairs of the 
State shall be devolved from the national government level to the local government level.
217
 The 
Constitution also provides that the people’s participation in democratic governance shall be 
promoted.
218
 Further, the Constitution emphasises that capacity of local authorities to initiate, 
manage and execute policies in respect of matters that affect the people within their respective 
districts shall be enhanced.
219
 All these objectives can be achieved in a democratic local 
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government system especially where local authorities have discretion to exercise executive and 
legislative powers.  
3.2. Executive and legislative powers of local government 
Having executive and legislative powers is a key component of a devolved system of local 
government. Thus, the 2016 Constitution provides that local authorities shall have autonomy in 
the exercise of executive and legislative powers.
220
 To this end, the Constitution provides that 
local authorities shall have powers to administer the district, oversee programmes and projects in 
the district, make by-laws and perform other prescribed functions.
221
 As earlier stated, such 
provisions empower local authorities to make legally binding decisions with respect to 
administration and management of local affairs.
222
  
In addition, local authorities have exclusive functions
223
 listed in Annex C of the Constitution. 
Among the exclusive functions of local authorities are powers over levies, tariffs, tolls, trading, 
vehicle licensing, local tourism, local spatial planning, markets and local roads
224
 among others. 
These exclusive functions can empower local authorities to implement local policies which are 
locally directed and driven by promoting accountability of local administrative officials to sub-
national governments.
225
 However, implementation of local policies, to large extent, requires 
financial powers. 
3.3. Financial powers 
The 2016 Constitution entrenches financial powers of local authorities by providing that local 
authorities should establish a sound financial base with reliable and predictable sources of 
revenue.
226
 Further, local authorities are empowered to levy, impose, recover and retain local 
taxes.
227
 Local authorities also have power to raise loans to finance their operations.
228
 The 
discretion to raise and manage own revenue is enhanced by non-interference by central 
government. 
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3.4. Prohibitions to interfere 
The 2016 Constitution guarantees the autonomy of local authorities in administering their local 
affairs without interference. For instance, Article 152(2) of the Constitution provides that the 
national government and provincial administration shall not interfere with or compromise a local 
authority’s ability or right to perform its functions.229 Principally, these provisions seem to 
suggest that central government will no longer be directly involved in the administration and 
management of council affairs. From the provisions on the system of governance, the 2016 
Constitution seems to guarantee the autonomy of local authorities in administering local affairs 
within their jurisdictions.
230
 However, the current practice is that local authorities have limited 
autonomy particularly in human resource matters. These functions are the sole responsibilities of 
the LGSC as provided for in the Constitution and the Service Commissions Act No. 10 of 2016. 
4. Constitutional provisions on the functions of the Local Government Service Commission 
Article 227 of the Constitution provides for the establishment of the Local Government Service 
(LGS) and the LGSC. The LGSC shall constitute offices in the Local Government Service, 
appoint, confirm, promote and hear appeals from officers of the Local Government Service.
231
 
Further, the Constitution provides that the LGSC shall ensure efficient and effective functioning 
of local authorities and perform such other functions as prescribed.
232
 From the wording of 
Article 228(2)(b), the Constitution implies that the LGSC "constitutes offices", so that means it 
determines organisational structures. This means that the LGSC has authority to create or abolish 
any post in a council.  
The 2016 Constitution empowers the LGSC to manage all human resource matters relating to 
staff appointments, transfers, determination of complaints and appeals of town clerks and council 
secretaries and other senior officers of the Local Government Service.
233
 It could be argued that 
Article 227(2) seems to suggest that all local authority staff is part of the LGS. However, despite 
there being one LGS, not all officers of the Local Government Service are appointed by the 
LGSC. Article 228 (2)(a) seems to suggest that the LGSC does not appoint all staff but only 
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appoints the Town Clerk and the Council Secretary. However, the entrenchment of the LGSC to 
manage human resource matters for all employees of the local service contradicts the very 
precepts of decentralisation envisaged in Article 152 of the 2016 Constitution and has a number 
of implications of the effective functioning of councils. 
5. Reflections on the functions of the LGSC 
The Constitutional provisions which empower the LGSC to manage human resource matters 
have implications on the operations of local authorities. Some of the implications are as a result 
of contradictory and unclear constitutional provisions, impacts on accountability of local 
government staff and power to determine organisational structures are discussed below. 
5.1. Contradictory and unclear provisions  
The 2016 Constitution has a number of provisions which are contradictory. Some of the 
contradictory provisions relate to Articles 152 and 228. Article 152(2) stipulates the right of local 
authorities to perform their functions without being impeded or compromised by higher 
governments whereas Article 228 establishes the LGSC to administer staff matters for local 
authorities. Therefore, Article 228(a)(c) contradicts Article 152(2) that stipulates the right of 
local authorities to perform their functions without being impeded or compromised by higher 
governments. Despite Article 152 of the Constitution providing for a devolved local government 
system, Article 228 provides for centralisation of administrative powers by establishing the 
LGSC to administer staff matters in local authorities. Through the re-establishment of the LGSC 
to administer staff matters, the national government has centralised council functions in staff 
matters. Hence, the role of the LGSC undermines the ability of local authorities to carry out their 
duties effectively without interference. Therefore, despite the Constitution giving local 
authorities’ autonomy with one hand, it takes away the autonomy of local authorities with the 
other by centralising staff appointments through the LGSC. This adversely affects the operations 
of councils as opposed to enhancing the capacity of local authorities to improve service delivery. 
It can therefore, be argued that the entrenchment of the LGSC in Article 228 of the Constitution 
seems to imply that central government has reneged on devolution and instead centralised the 
powers and functions of local authorities. 
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The Constitution further has unclear provisions. For instance, the Constitution envisages that 
Article 227 says there is one Local Government Service yet Article 228 says that the LGSC 
appoints the Town Clerks and the Council Secretaries. It thereby, implies that the rest of the staff 
is appointed by the local authorities in terms of the rules that are set up by the LGSC.  
5.2. Implications on autonomy and accountability of local government staff 
Despite the Constitution guaranteeing that the accountability,
234
 as well as the democratic 
exercise of power by local authorities shall be ensured,
235
 centralisation of staff recruitment puts 
the accountability of councils in a very difficult position and compromises the autonomy and 
accountability of local authorities. In reality, councils are supposed to be accountable to the 
people with respect to the efficient administration of their local areas because they are the ones 
held responsible by residents for non-implementation of projects.
236
 But the current practice in 
Zambia makes accountability difficult because councils have no influence whatsoever on the 
performance of their staff. As a result, local administrative officials would rather be accountable 
to the national government which appoints them instead of the sub-national government they 
work for.
237
 Thus, councils would not effectively deliver on their mandate by using public sector 
employees whom they do not have control over.
238
 If local authorities were allowed to recruit 
their own staff, it would promote accountability as local authorities would have the power to 
hold staff accountable for their performance. Connected to staff matters is the implication on 
staff transfers.  
5.2.1. Implications on staff transfers 
The LGSC is mandated to transfer local government staff.
239
  However, the manner in which 
these transfers are done affects council operations. Transfers are done arbitrary and in 
uncoordinated manner and mostly against the wishes of the staff concerned and the consent of 
the local authorities.
 240
 Further, these uncoordinated transfers have had a bearing on the financial 
base of local authorities. The financial stability of local authorities has been affected because 
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they have to source for funds to pay settling-in- allowances for staff transferred to these 
councils.
241
   
5.3. Implications on the power to determine own organisational structure 
The LGSC has the power to determine organisational structures by constituting offices in the 
local government service.
242
 Centrally determining organisational structures may lead to low 
morale and motivation and lack of environmental adaption. As a result of lack of power to 
determine their own organisational structure, local authorities find it difficult to adapt their 
internal administrative procedures to the local environment.
243
  
6. Conclusion 
In this chapter, it was discussed that the 2016 Zambian Constitution lays a firm foundation for 
devolution and administrative autonomy of local authorities by providing values and principles 
that guide council administration. It was explained in the chapter that the Constitution provides 
that the management and administration of the political, social, legal and economic affairs of the 
State shall be devolved from the national government level to the local government level. 
Further, the Constitution provides that local authorities are spheres of government with exclusive 
powers to administer the district. But despite laying a firm foundation for a devolved local 
government system, the 2016 Constitution contradicts the precepts of devolution by also 
providing centralist provisions which are not consistent with the principles of a decentralised 
local government system of autonomy and accountability. The re-establishment of the LGSC has 
implications on devolution, the appointment of staff, transfer of staff and power to determine 
their own organisational structure. Further, the Constitution does not specify the appointment of 
all employees of the local government service. In view of the implications of the re-
establishment of the LGSC on local authorities, the following chapter focus on recommendations 
by suggesting what needs to change to bring the legislation discussed in this Chapter in line with 
the 2016 Constitution. 
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CHAPTER FIVE  
Conclusion and recommendations 
1. Introduction 
This thesis analysed administrative autonomy of local government in Zambia under the 2016 
Constitution. The thesis sought to contribute towards a better understanding of local government 
administrative authority by identifying the strengths and weaknesses of the decentralisation 
framework provided for in the 2016 Constitution.  
From the analysis of the general constitutional framework for local government, several 
challenges pertaining to autonomy and accountability were pointed out. Thus, in this chapter, the 
study provides the concluding analysis and offers recommendations to improve the ability of 
sub-national governments to operate in an autonomous and accountable manner in order to 
effectively deliver services.  
This concluding chapter has two objectives. First, it provides the major findings of this study. 
Second, it suggests some recommendations of what needs to change in the legislation in order for 
administrative autonomy in local government to be actualised as envisaged in the spirit and letter 
of the 2016 Constitution. On the basis of the analysis and recommendations, the Chapter 
concludes with an answer to the research question presented in Chapter One.  
2. Major findings of the study 
On the basis of the principles and values of decentralisation and the system of local government 
administration in Zambia, the following are the major findings of this thesis; 
a) Decentralisation helps to deepen democracy and limit the centralisation of power by 
empowering local authorities to make legally binding decisions with respect to 
administration and management of local affairs. It was further submitted that 
administrative autonomy in a devolved system ensures that implementation of local 
policies is locally directed and driven by promoting the accountability of local 
administrative officials to sub-national governments and not to the national governments.  
b) Administrative autonomy is an important measure of the degree of decentralisation. 
Administrative autonomy has key design features which include the power to determine 
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internal administrative procedures and the discretion to appoint, remunerate, discipline 
and dismiss staff and monitoring and supervision. It was therefore, submitted that several 
institutional arrangements need to be considered to capitalise on the benefits of 
administrative autonomy. 
c) Zambia has struggled with the issue of administrative autonomy. The country has 
meandered back and forth from 1964 to 2016 from the separate, to unified and to 
integrated administrations due to several challenges that have confronted the system of 
local government. Some of the challenges relate to poor service delivery, failure by local 
authorities to attract and retain qualified staff, poor conditions of service, lack of policy 
guidelines on recruitment, divided loyalty due to certain recruitment policies, 
councillor/officer relationship, favouritism and nepotism among others. In short, the 
reason for the swings from one system to another was to make local government 
responsive, democratic and ensure that relevant personnel policies are developed for 
improved service delivery. 
d) The thesis argued that despite laying a firm foundation for a devolved local government 
system, the 2016 Constitution constrains administrative autonomy in several ways. First, 
the Constitution allows the LGSC to employ the Town Clerk and Council Secretary but 
does not specify the appointment of all employees of the local government service. 
Second, local authorities have no power to determine their own organisational structure. 
Instead, the power to determine organisational structures lies with the LGSC. Last, the 
challenges of the centralised system of recruitment and selection of staff as conducted by 
the LGSC, is that it tends to lead to bureaucratic tendencies, thereby delaying the 
recruitment and selection process. Thus, the continuation of the LGSC to manage human 
resource matters in local authorities contradicts the very precepts of decentralisation by 
devolution envisaged in the Constitution.  
It may therefore, be concluded that despite the 2016 Zambian Constitution categorically 
providing for a devolved local government system, the current practice of local governance 
raises serious concerns regarding the extent to which local authorities in Zambia actually have 
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administrative autonomy. Thus, the following section suggests what needs to change in the 
legislation to enhance administrative autonomy. 
3. Recommendations 
In the preceding sections the chapter provides major conclusions or findings of this study. In this 
section the chapter provides proposals which can be considered when reforming the system of 
local government administration to guarantee administrative autonomy, especially given the fact 
that the 1995 Local Government Act and Local Government Service Regulations are undergoing 
review to align them with the 2016 Constitution. The study established that the provisions of the 
2016 Constitution on a devolved local government system are not consistent with the principles 
of devolution. What is required is the development of a legal framework that reflects the 
constitutional spirit of a decentralised local government system and devolution of power. Some 
of the issues which may be considered when developing a new institutional framework are 
provided below.   
3.1. Devolved system of local government 
The study established that the 2016 Constitution provides for values and principles of devolution. 
For example, devolution is identified as one of the key features of the system of governance.
244
 
In fact, Article 147 of the Constitution carries a constitutional instruction for the national 
government to devolve power to the local government level. It was however, argued that there 
are identified contradictions which regard to the operations of local authorities and the LGSC in 
the 2016 Constitution. It was argued in Chapter Four that whereas article 147 of the 2016 
Constitution provides for a devolved system of governance, Article 228 of the same Constitution 
provides for re-centralisation of local government functions by establishing the LGSC to 
administer staff matters for local authorities. It was argued that Article 227 provides that there is 
one Local Government Service but that not all local authority staff is appointed by the LGSC.  
Article 227(2) says all local authority staff are part of the Local Government Service, but Article 
228 (2)(a) seems to suggest that the Commission does not appoint all staff but only appoints the 
Town Clerk and the Council Secretary. Thus, it is submitted that there is need for legislation that 
clearly stipulates the officers of the service commission which the LGSC can appoint and which 
ones can be appointed by Town Clerks or Council Secretaries. Such legislation should speak to 
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the constitutional spirit of devolution and the development of service regulations to 
operationalise the provisions of Article 147 and Article 151 of the 2016 Constitution. Thus, it is 
submitted that legislation should be enacted, informed by principles of devolution, to give clearer 
and narrower guidance to the work of the LGSC. Such legislation should strengthen local 
government autonomy and eliminate inconsistences between the functions of national 
government and local government. 
3.2. Organisational structure 
It was established in Chapters Two and Four that local authorities should have the power to 
determine their own organisational structure. Having the power to determine own organisational 
structures would help councils to design organisational structures that serve the specific needs of 
their local areas. The lack of such powers makes it difficult for local governments to adapt their 
internal administrative procedures to the local environment.
245
  It is therefore, submitted that 
legislation should be enacted that forces the LGSC to consult local governments before making 
its decisions on organisational structures. 
3.3. Staff matters 
The LGSC should play an oversight role in terms of staff matters by monitoring the effectiveness 
of local government and the decentralisation process, advising government on local government 
issues, promoting and administering local government training institutions. Thus, it is submitted 
that the LGSC should relinquish human resource powers to councils while retaining the 
functions of monitoring and evaluating compliance with the code of ethics and human resource 
management principles.
246
 Further, appointment of Town Clerks or Council Secretaries and 
senior managers should be done by human resource committees in the various councils. The 
appointments should be based on employment contracts and performance agreements in order to 
enhance performance and accountability so as to improve service delivery. 
 Further, Town Clerks and Council Secretaries should have the right to discipline and dismiss 
lower-level employees who are underperforming, subject to due process and approval from the 
council and the LGSC. This will enhance accountability on the part of employees as well as 
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avoiding the problem of divided loyalties.
247
 For councils which might experience difficulties in 
attracting and retaining skilled manpower, it may be necessary to establish a system where the 
national government deploys some of its skilled employees to such councils.  
Thus, legislation should be designed so as to safeguard local authorities against critical shortages 
of skilled and qualified manpower, lack of clear personnel policies, poor personnel management 
and over-staffing; especially in the middle and lower management cadres by providing for 
national support in cases where a local authority cannot attract qualified staff. 
3.4. Staff transfers 
It was observed that the LGSC has the sole responsibility of transferring local government staff. 
It was contended that the challenge being experienced by councils is the manner in which the 
transfers are done. The transferring of staff by the LGSC contradicts Article 152(2) that gives 
local authorities the right to perform their functions without being impeded or compromised by 
higher governments. It was submitted in Chapter Four that transfers done in this manner have a 
bearing on the financial base of local authorities. It was contended that the LGSC makes 
arbitrary decisions on transfers because there is nothing in the 2016 Constitution or legislation 
that instructs the LGSC to consult councils regarding transfers. This demotivates members of 
staff who are transferred from one council to another on a regular basis. Thus, it is submitted that 
the Service Commissions Act should be amended to clearly stipulate in a predicable manner how 
transfers should be done such as seeking the consent of the individual and the affected local 
authorities. Such legislation should promote transparency in transfers and ensure that transfers 
are done in ways which do not endanger local autonomy. 
3.5. Filling of vacancies 
It was argued in Chapter Two that administrative autonomy may lead to two major drawbacks. 
First, it may constrict the interregional mobility of civil servants, and therefore their career 
paths.
248
  Second, it may lead to discriminatory hiring practices at the local level where some 
heads of local authorities may engage in preferential treatment or discrimination based on 
ethnicity, religion, or other special interests.
249
 Thus, it is submitted that there should be 
                                                          
247
 Fessha Y & Kirkby C (2015) 260. 
248
 Green AE (2005) 138. 
249
 Green AE (2005) 138. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
57 | P a g e  
 
legislation on national hiring rules. Such legislation should have national procedural rules to 
ensure fair hiring to curb the potential of constricting of interregional mobility and help ensure 
national unity and acceptable levels of service delivery in more remote regions.  
3.6. Supervision  
It was observed in Chapter Four that the LGSC has unlimited supervisory powers over local 
authorities.
250
 Such powers include the power to appoint, re-grade, promote, transfer, discipline 
and terminate employment.
 251
 It was argued in Chapter Two that if local authorities have such 
powers, they will be accountable to the communities they serve with regards to service delivery.
 
252
 Thus, it is submitted that legislation should be enacted to redefine the role of the LGSC. Such 
legislation should establish service regulations to ensure that the LGSC plays an oversight role of 
monitoring the operations of councils that it is in line with Article 228 as long as it pertains to 
staff other than the Town Clerks and Council Secretaries. Where need be, there should be 
intervention powers in order to create an appropriate balance between the requirement for 
supervision and the need for local autonomy. This would ensure adherence to set national 
standards, guidelines and principles of human resource management matters and avoid abuse of 
administrative autonomy by local authorities. 
4. Answering the research question 
The overall research question of this thesis was whether the legal and institutional framework in 
the devolved local government system under the 2016 Constitution is consistent with principles 
of decentralisation and administrative autonomy to enable sub-national governments to play a 
pivotal role in the delivery of basic services in an effective and efficient manner. In Chapter 
Two, the design features and institutional arrangements which must be made to capitalise on the 
benefits of administrative autonomy yet not suffer negative effects were examined. The study 
established that the Zambian system of local government administration lacks key features which 
are necessary if councils are to play a role in development and democracy in a decentralised 
setting. The thesis has argued that in order to enhance performance and service delivery, local 
governments should have the autonomy to determine their own organisational structures and 
exercise power to employ personnel a council needs. However, the current practice points to the 
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fact that devolution in Zambia is a fallacy. The establishment of the LGSC in Article 228 of the 
2016 Constitution contradicts the principles and values of a devolved local system. The functions 
of the LGSC constrain administrative autonomy of local authorities thereby inhibiting service 
delivery and development. The power conferred on the LGSC to appoint, transfer and discipline 
staff and setting of council’s internal procedures is inconsistent with the constitutional spirit of 
devolution. This negatively impacts on the performance of councils. 
Furthermore, the increased control over sub-national governments by the central government has 
provided a weak decentralisation framework and restricted local autonomy, thereby negatively 
affecting service delivery. Thus, the overall conclusion of the study is that the system of local 
government administration in Zambia is less likely to realise the benefits of administrative 
autonomy. What is required is the full implementation of the 2016 Constitution by enacting 
relevant pieces of legislation that would empower local authorities to administer their respective 
districts. The national government must devolve power to local authorities as required by the 
Constitution. The right of local authorities to administer local affairs in the district must be 
respected, protected and promoted. It is hoped that the national government will be supportive of 
the idea to fully decentralise the system of local government administration by devolving powers 
and responsibilities to councils. In addition, local authorities should be given adequate fiscal 
powers, significant expenditure responsibilities and some measure of discretion when 
undertaking delegated functions.  
The operations of local authorities will however, require the national government to supervise 
them through the LGSC. Such supervision, however, should be regulated and exercised within 
the legal framework that clearly defines responsibilities and standards to realise the benefits of 
administrative autonomy and mitigate the negative effects of decentralisation. In this way, the 
development of mechanisms of promoting administrative autonomy will be underscored. 
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